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RECENT CASES
Censorship-Classification of Motion Picture of Spanish War as Newsreel and Not Subject to Censorship--"Spain in Flames" is a motion picture
of the actual events of the present Spanish insurrection, preceded by a short
historical summary. The running comment in the sound track contains various
gratuitous references 1 to Fascist governments and their participation in the conflict. The Pennsylvania State Board of Censors, pursuant to statute,2 barred
the showing of the film as immoral and improper. On appeal, held, that the
film was a "newsreel" over which the Board has no power of censorship, under
the express provisions of the statute.3 In re Appeal of Board of Censors, Phila.
C. P. Ct. No. 6, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Nov. 26, 1937, P. I, col. 2.
The introduction of full length films, portraying a series of events only
partially contemporaneous with the showing of the film, has raised for the first
time the problem of construing the term "current news events". The instant
court employed a circuitous method of reasoning in attempting to solve the problem. It adopted timeliness as the test of currency, and then concluded that the
events in "Spain in Flames" were timely since the "Spanish rebellion is still
current." I Although this result is of little value in establishing a definition, the
rest of the opinion strongly indicates that a very broad construction of the word
"current" should be adopted in order to avoid conflict with the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and press. And although the historical summary and several comments in the sound track could scarcely in themselves be
considered as descriptive of "current news events", the court decided that inasmuch as it had construed the main portion as a newsreel, the incidental details
were also immune from censorship. 5 Thus, the decision as a whole constitutes
a commendably liberal interpretation of the immunity prescribed by the Legislature. In view of the well established judicial restraint on censorship of newspapers, 6 and the statutory restraint on radio censorship,7 it is certainly consistent
that newsreels in their broadest sense should not be subject to the censorship
statutes.
i. Typical of the statements are the following: "The Fascists, with superior Italian and

German planes, tanks, and guns, swept the people's army back on Madrid." "Long live
Democracy I Down with Fascism I"
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 4, § 43. For film censorship statutes in other
states, see Rosenberg, Censorship in the United States (1928) 32 L. N. 49, 53; Notes (193o)

64 A. L. R. 5o5.
3. PA. STAT. Awx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 4, § 43: "This section shall not apply to . . .
films or reels containing current news events or happenings, commonly known as newsreels,
which are not in violation of the provisions of this section." (The court failed to note the
contradictory and nugatory effect of the last clause.) A similar exception is contained in
statutes in other states. See Note (I93O) 44 HAv. L. REV. 113, x15, n. 24.
4. Instant case at p. 8, col. 2.

5. In a dictum, the court refused to review the Board's decision that the objectionable
comments were "immoral" under the statute, on the ground that it would not substitute its
standard of morality for that of the Board. While this attitude is commendable, it is not always
followed. Cf. Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N. W. 152 (1936), 41 L. N. 13 (937)
(court substituted its standard for that of administrative body) ; Equitable Motion Picture
Corp. Appeal, 25 Pa. Dist. 114 (1915) (de novo consideration of question of morality on appeal). But see In re Franklin Film Mfg. Co., 253 Pa. 422, 98 Atl. 623 (ii6).
6. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 233 U. S. 233, 245, 249 (1936) ; De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937) ; Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467,
474, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752, 757 (ist Dep't, igg). For an example of the extreme protection
given newspapers, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 724, n. I (931).
7. FmaERAL COMMuNIcATIoNs ACT, 48 STAT. i09i (I934), 47 U. S. C. A.

§326 (Supp.
1936). The cases decided under this Act have given rise to the argument that despite the ex(305)
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Constitutional Law-Applicability of Federal Interpleader Act When
Several States Seek to Levy Inheritance Taxes Upon Same PropertyDecedent left tangible property and a considerable amount of intangible property in both California and Massachusetts. Tax officials of each state claimed
decedent's domicile was within their respective jurisdictions, and sought to levy
an inheritance tax upon the transfer of all of the intangible property. The executor filed a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, under the terms of the
Federal Interpleader Act,1 joining the tax officials of both states as defendants,
in order to have determined which state could constitutionally levy the tax. The
Circuit Court dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction, 2 on the ground that
the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, since it was, in substance, a
suit against the state. Held, that the bill was properly dismissed, because it violated the Eleventh Amendment, and because the pending action of the state
tax officials in no way threatened violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, U. S. Sup. Ct.,

(1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 339.
The decision of the Circuit Court was criticized in a former issue of the
REviEw 3 as holding, in effect, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit several states from adjudicating the domicile of the decedent to be within
their respective jurisdictions, and from levying inheritance taxes on the identical intangible property. The Supreme Court pointed out that the two state
inheritance tax laws in question are not unconstitutional, as neither purports
to tax intangibles of a decedent domiciled elsewhere; that if the courts of a
state erroneously decide that a decedent was domiciled within its jurisdiction,
the Constitution does not guarantee against such judicial error.' It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not see fit to validate the use of the Federal
Interpleader Act in these situations. No other plan is apparent whereby the
legal anomaly that a man may, in effect, be domiciled in more than one state,
and the multiple taxation that may result, can be avoided. 5

Constitutional Law-Immunity from Federal Taxation of Income of
Beneficiary of Trust in Lease of School Lands from State-An oil company
leased school lands from the state of Wyoming, on terms providing for a royalty
to the state. Previously, petitioner and the oil company had entered a trust
press exemption from censorship, the Commission can act as a censor in withholding licenses
if the operation of the radio station is not in the public interest. KIFKB Broadcasting Association v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F. (2d) 670 (App. D. C. 1931); Trinity Methodist
Church v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F. (2d) 850 (App. D. C. 1932). Siegel, Censorship in Radio (1936) 7 AIR L. RLv. i; Kassner, Radio Censorship (1937) 8 AiR L. Ray. 99;
Note (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 634.
1. 49 STAT. o96, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1936).
2. 89 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937).
3. (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 844.

4. The Court went on to suggest that perhaps neither state would be wrong, stating that
. . . conflicting decisions upon the same issue of fact do not necessarily connote erroneous
judicial actions. . . . an appellate court [might] conclude that in none is the judgment
erroneous." It then concluded: "Hence it cannot be said that the threatened action of respondents involves any breach of state law or of the laws or Constitution of the United
States.'
5. A few years ago it would have seemed clear that the Fourteenth Amendment could
have been availed of against such multiple taxation. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930), 16 IowA L. REV. 415; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284
U. S. 312 (1932), 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 6o5. But subsequent cases made the Court's attitude

more doubtful. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276 (1932), 32 CoL. L. REV. 534;
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (i937), 85 U. oF PA. L. Rrv. 645; New
York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U. S. 366 (I937), 37 COL. L. REv. 661.
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agreement whereby the oil company was to hold an undivided 50 per cent. interest in the lease and the net proceeds thereof in trust for the petitioner. Held
(Phillips, J., dissenting), that the proceeds derived by the petitioner from the
sale of oil from the state school lands are immune from the federal income tax,
because the lease was a state instrumentality, and the petitioner was as much a
lessee of the school lands as was its trustee, the oil company.1 Mountain Producers Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 92 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A.
1oth, 1937).
While the dogma has been clear since Collector v. Day,2 that a state governmental instrumentality is immune from federal taxation, the application of the
rule to situations involving the lease of state school lands has met with singular difficulty. 8 Cases of this type concededly meet the requirement that the
activity of the state under which the exemption is claimed-here the support of
its schools-be of a strictly governmental character. 4 Hence, the courts have
looked to the directness of the burden which would be imposed upon the state
by the asserted tax,5 although in the converse situation-state taxation of a federal instrumentality-it would seem that the courts have refused to deny immunity merely because of the remoteness of the burden.6 In the state lease
cases, the more liberal opinion has been that a tax on the proceeds derived by
even the original lessee of the state might well be sustained, although to some7
degree it might diminish the consideration given in return for future leases.
Where, however, the person to be taxed is a sublessee, there would seem to be8
greater reason to deny immunity, and the circuit courts of appeals have so held.
By analogy, it would appear that the beneficiary of the trust agreement in the
instant case should be denied exemptionY Furthermore, the trust agreement,
as a practical matter, was a private transaction for personal gain, and the assessment was levied only on the net profits of the petitioner, so that the effect, if
I. A further question involved the determination of gross income as the basis for cornputa'tion of the depletion allowance of petitioner, where the latter had sold all the oil to be
produced and the vendee was to conduct production. Instant case at 79.
2. 1I Wall. 113 (U. S. 187o).
3. I PAUL A TD MERTES, FEDmRAL INcomE TAXATION (1934) § 6.70.
; Brush v. Commissioner, 300
4. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (o5)
U. S. 352 (1937) ; Spaulding v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 957 (S. D. Cal. I937) ; see Burnet
For a view that the doctrine originated
v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 5o8, 5,5 (933).
in a misinterpretation of the meaning of South Caroliav. United States, see Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of Federal Activities (925) 34
YALE L. J. 8o7, 828. See also Lowndes, The Supreme Court on Taxation, z936 Tern (937)
86 U. OF PA. L. RFv. I, at 15.
5. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 50, (1922) ; Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U. S. 393 (1932) ; Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508 (I933) ; Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating Co., 300 U. S. I (I937) ; Marland v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 907 (Ct.
Cl. 193), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 658 (1933) ; Hobart Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d)
25 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 543 (1936).
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. i8ig) ; Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S.
5I (192o). But see the discussion in this issue of the REvmw, at 308, of James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (I937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 315.
(involving, however, a lease by
7. Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508 (933)
a municipality of land used for water supply purposes) ; Bankline Oil Co. v. Commissioners,
90 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. gth, 1937), cert. granted, 58 Sup. Ct. 119 (i937) ; see Brown, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federaland State Taxationin Intergovernmental RelaJios-1932-I935 (936) 24 GEO. L. J. 584, 599; cf. Group No. I Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S.
(where, under Texas law, leases of university lands convey title to the oil in
279 (931)
place). Contra: Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 (1932).
8. Hobart Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. denied,

299 U. S. 543 (1936).

Accord: Wanless Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 799 (C. C.

A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 765 (I935) (where the income received by petitioner,
the assignee of a state lease, from his sublessees was held taxable).
9. Dissenting opinion of Phillips, J., instant case at 81; Mountain Producers Corp., 34
B. T. A. 4o6 (1936), rev'd by the instant case.
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any, on the state would be remote. 10 In this era of expanding functions of
government, it is to be hoped that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
James v. Dravo ContractingCo.,- discussed in this issue of the REVIEW, 1 2 marks
the beginning of a trend toward the restriction of the immunities of state as
well as federal agencies, in the absence of a clear showing of a direct burden on
a governmental function. 3

Constitutional Law-State Taxation-Validity of State Tax on Gross
Income Received under Contract with Federal Government-Plaintiff had
four contracts to build locks and dams for the federal government. West Virginia imposed a gross income tax 1 on the amounts received from the United
States under the contracts. Held (Roberts, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, JJ., dissenting), that the tax is constitutional, because it imposes no substantial burden on the operations of the federal government.2 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 315.3
A careful examination of the majority opinion reveals that the present Supreme Court refuses as yet substantially to limit the implied immunity 4 of governmental instrumentalities from taxation. This in itself lends a depth of significance to the instant case which might not otherwise be warranted. Limiting
its holding to the facts, the Court, adhering to its established rule of reciprocity,5
merely applied to the present converse situation the rule of Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell," wherein a federal tax on the net income 7 of a state contractor was
upheld. While using language that would make the test of immunity one of
directness of burden," the Court did not apply that test to cases 9 wherein the
burden would seem to be as remote as in the instant case. Also, conspicuous
io. Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508 (1933) ; Hobart Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 543 (1936) ; Bankline Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 9o F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), cert. granted, 58 Sup. Ct. 119
(1937) ; dissenting opinion of Stone, J., in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393,
401 (1932) ; Brown, supra note 7, at 6o4.
II. (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 315.
12. (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 308.
13. Previously, the revolt against doctrinal immunity had been strongly voiced in the dissenting opinions of Justices Stone and Brandeis, in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.
S. 393, 401, 405 (1932), urging the overruling of Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 50, (1922) ;
cf. Roberts, J., dissenting in Brush v. Commissioner, 3oo U. S. 352, 375 (1936). See I PAUL,
AND MERTENS, loc. cit. supra note 3.
I. WEST VA. CODE (i93i) art. 11, § 13; amended by West Va. Acts (1933)

c. 33.
2. The case also involved the territorial jurisdiction of the state to lay the tax. The
Court held that the tax was invalid as regards income received from work done outside the
state, but that the fact that the dam was built on the bed of a navigable river did not deprive
the state of jurisdiction. Instant case at 316.
3. The court applied its decision in this case as the decision for two other cases that were
pending, involving the same question. Silas Mason Co. v. Commissioner and Ryan v. Washington, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 344.
4. This immunity was implied to preserve the dual form of government. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 430 (U. S. 1819) ; Collector v. Day, ii Wall. 113, 127 (U.
S. 187o) ; Indian Motocycle Co. v. Day, 283 U. S. 570, 575 (1930).
5. Collector v. Day, ii Wall. 113, at 724 (U. S. 1870) ; see Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U. S. 514, 521 (1926) ; (1936) 49 I-ARv. L. REV. 1323.
6. 269 U. S. 514 (1926).
7. The present Court held that there was no controlling distinction between a gross income tax and a net income tax in so far as the present situation was concerned. Instant case
at 319.
8. Instant case at 320.
9. The Court expressedly refused to use this test in relation to governmental securities.
Instant case at 318.
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by its absence was a discussion of the recent Brush case, 10 in which a tax by the
federal government on the income of an engineer employed by New York City
in its water department was held invalid. In that case, Justice Roberts, in a
dissenting opinion,:" thought that since the tax was not a "palpable" burden on
the government, it should be held valid. Yet in the instant case, where the
burden on the federal government would seem no more palpable, Justice Roberts, dissenting, ruled that the tax was invalid,' 2 without mentioning his former
views. Because of the strong dissenting opinion in the Brush case, and the
recent change in the membership of the Court,' it had been hoped that the
immunity doctrine would be so revised as to limit the exemption so that it would
apply only to a discriminatory tax: 14 in particular, that such a revision would
permit non-discriminatory taxation of the income from government bonds. If
the test is to be one of remoteness of burden, it is difficult to see a difference
in the burden placed on the government when a tax is imposed on the income
from loans, and when a tax is collected on the income from services.' 5 However,
the majority of the Court indicated that the former would still be unconstituThe instant case also leaves in doubt the Court's present attitude on
tional.'
the important question of the validity of a state income tax on the salary of employees of the many new corporations 17 set up by the present administration.'"
On the other hand, one possible result of this case may be to open an avenue of
taxation prohibited by the Panhandle,' and Indian Motocycle 20 cases, wherein
taxes on sales to the government were held invalid. The present Court expressly limited the effect of those decisions, 2' and did not seriously attempt to
distinguish them. Furthermore, the Court's opinion, that the effect which a tax
might have on the cost to the government of the services contracted for is not
conclusive as to the validity of the tax, would seem to be a departure from its
former views. 22 If future decisions should sustain this implication, both state
io. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352 (1936), 5o HARv. L. Rv. 98o.

II. Id. at 374. In speaking of the general problem of implied immunity, Justice Roberts
said, "The rules governing the enforcement of those laws . . . require an attempt at

rationalization and restatement."

Id. at 375. He then suggested the rules to be adopted

should involve only two limitations on taxation by either government: the tax must not discriminate; and it must not directly burden the operation of the other.
12. Instant case at 320.
13. Justice Black has replaced Justice Van Devanter, who has retired.
i4. It is interesting to note that it was the Solicitor General of the United States who
asked for such a revision. (i937) 5 U. S. L. WEER: 17.
i5. See dissenting opinion, instant case at 321.

i6. Due to the holding in the instant case, the Subcommittee of the House Ways and
Means Committee dropped all proposals to tax salaries of state and municipal employees, and
to levy on the interest from government bonds. N. Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1937, p. 6, col. 2.

17. For a complete discussion of these enterprises, see Culp, Creation of Governmental

Corporatiols (1935) 33 Micar. L. REv. 437; Note (i935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 346.
i8. The majority justices point out that they are not ruling on a case of the taxation of
the employees of governmental instrumentalities. Instant case at 318. The Supreme Court
of Kansas recently upheld a state income tax on the salary of a stenographer employed by

such corporations. It based its holding on the remoteness of the burden, and on the extensiveness with which the federal government has entered the field of private enterprise. Clinton
v. State Tax Commissioner, Kan. Sup. Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEa 184. For a discussion of

this problem see Boudin, Taxation of Governmental Izstrumentalities (1933) 22 GEo. L. J.
i; Jacobson, State Jurisdiction to Tax Incomes (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 795; Lowndes,
The Supremie Court on Taxation, x936 Term (937) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rav. i.
i9. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928). This case was recently sustained in Groves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 (935).
2o. Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1930).

Instant case at 318.
See Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 575, where the Court, with
a collection of authority, pointed out that if there was the slightest burden the tax was invalid, for the immunity was complete.
2.
22.
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and federal governments will have opened to them a lucrative field of direct taxation. Finally, in rejecting the argument that if the tax were sustained the
states could destroy the federal government's power to obtain services by contract,2 3 the Court seems to have cast off the oft-quoted dictum of Chief Justice

Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."

24

Constitutional Law-Validity of Federal Act Permitting Insolvent
Taxing Agencies to Effect Voluntary Compositions With Creditors-Petitioner, an insolvent California irrigation district, sought the court's confirmation of a plan of readjustment of its bonded indebtedness under the Second
Municipal Bankruptcy Act,' which reenacted the basic provisions of the Sumners Act 2 without including counties or political subdivisions. Following a
motion to dismiss the petition, entered by bondholders of petitioner who had
not accepted the plan, held, that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to
petitioner, because the federal bankruptcy power 3 cannot be exercised over those
agencies which perform state governmental functions. In re Lindsay-Strathmore
IrrigationDistrict, S. D. Cal., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 297.
The case of Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No.
i, 4 discussed and criticized in previous issues of this REVIEW, 5 held that the

Sumners Act, in permitting political subdivisions of the states to file voluntary
petitions in bankruptcy, unconstitutionally interfered with the domestic affairs
of the states. Since the Sumners Act was subsequently construed as applying
only to political subdivisions, 6 assistance by the Federal Government in the field
of municipal bankruptcy was impossible without further legislation. 7 The new
Act was passed as an emergency measure" to facilitate readjustments inaugurated under the Sumners Act. 9 Framed with the idea of circumventing the
Ashton decision, the new Act was aimed at those agencies which are not political subdivisions.10 Consequently, it omitted any reference to "counties" or
"political subdivisions", and also emphasized the voluntary nature of the pro23. The Court said that Congress would have the power to exempt the contractors from
taxation if the burden became too great. Instant case at 320. The Court's stand would have
-been much clearer had it adopted the view of Justice Holmes: "The power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this court sits." Dissenting opinion in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928).

2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (U. S. 1819).

i. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. I6, 1937).
2. 48 STAT. 798 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (Supp. 1936). This was the First
Municipal Bankruptcy Act.
3. U. S. CoesT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4. 298 U. S. 513 (1936).
5. (1936) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. iii; see also In re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. Tex. 1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 920 (1935) ; In re
Contra Costa Irrigation Dist., io F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. io2.
For additional discussions, see Note (1936) I5 N. C. L. REv. 46; (1936) 6 BRooKcYxN L.
Rzv. 102; (1937) 21 MiNr. L. REV. 205; (I937) 10 So. CALiF. L. REv. 202; (0936) 23 VA.

L. REv. 8z.
6. In re Imperial Irrigation Dist., 87 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
7. The states are powerless in the matter, since the constitutional provision against state
laws impairing the obligation of contracts prohibits legislation by the states which would
cancel any pre-existing indebtedness. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10; Sturges v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. i8ig).
8. § 84 of the Act provides for its termination June 30, 1940.
9. Hearings before Subcommittee on Banking and Reorganization, Committee on the
Judiciary, on H. R. 25o5, 2506 and 5969, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (937) 31.
10. SEN. REP. No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 2.
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ceedings."- By so drafting the new Act, Congress planned to enter the field2
which it felt was not covered and hence not prohibited by the Ashton decision.3
However, the instant court, in considering the new Act, construed that decision
as outlawing any federal bankruptcy law directed at taxing agencies which,
under the authority of the state, exercise the sovereign powers of taxation and
eminent domain.' 3 Viewed in this light, the instant case reached the correct,
although perhaps not the most salutary,"4 result with respect to the new Act,
since the subjects included by it differ only in description from those embraced
by the Sumners Act.

Corporate Reorganization-Dismissal of Voluntary Petition of Dissolved Corporation for Reorganization under 77B-In 1931 an Illinois corporation was dissolved for non-payment of taxes, but under a state statute was
permitted to sue and be sued for two years following dissolution for the purpose of winding up its affairs.' In 1935, after the two-year period had run,
but while two mortgage suits instituted during the period were still being defended, the dissolved corporation filed a voluntary petition for reorganization
under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Held (Cardozo, Stone, and Black, JJ.,
dissenting), that the decree approving the petition should be reversed, because
the dissolved corporation did not have the legal capacity to petition for reorganization. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Building Corp., U. S.
Sup. Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 243.
Raising for the first time in the Supreme Court the problem of the legal
status of a dissolved corporation in federal bankruptcy proceedings, the instant
decision is contrary to a tendency on the part of the lower courts to adopt a broad
definition of the type of corporate entity subject to federal jurisdiction under
the Bankruptcy Act.3 Under both the old liquidation laws and the new reorganization provisions, the federal district and circuit courts have permitted
petitions to be filed by creditors for the involuntary bankruptcy of corporations
in various stages of dissolution.4 And in the only other two cases that have
arisen involving a voluntary petition for reorganization filed by the dissolved
corporation itself, the courts have applied the principles laid down in regard
to creditors' petitions, with no clear suggestion that a different rule should be
iu. Black, Has Congress Circumvented the Ashton Decision? (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 683.
12. S x. REP. No. 911, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (937) 2.
13. The Ashton decision was similarly construed in Brush v. Commissioner, 3oo U. S.

352, 368 (937).

14. See the last paragraph of the instant case, where judge Yankwich says: "As a student
I agree with the conclusion of the dissenters. . . . However, as a judge . . . I
cannot exercise private judgment. . ...

Also, it should be noted that the taxing power, granted in the same clause of the Constitution, has been construed as including the power to tax state instrumentalities in their proprietary as opposed to their governmental capacity. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. i; South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905).
i. ILTi REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1929)
2. 48 STAT. 9g2 (1924), II U. S.

c. 32, §§ 14, 79.
C. A. §207 (934).
3. Bankruptcy Act, 3o STAT. 544 (I898), II U. S. C. A. § 1 (6) (i934), defines "corporations" to mean ". . . all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships. . . ." Compare Weinstein, Corporations Amenable to Section 77B (935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 853.
4. Petitions for liquidation: Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th,
1932) ; In re Thomas, 78 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935), 20 MARQ. L. RaV. 42, cert. denied,
296 U. S. 626 (935).
Petitions for reorganization: In re Surf Bldg. Corp., ii F. Supp. 295
(E. D. Il. 1934) ; ln re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 76 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935), 2 VA. L. REV. 465 (1936), aff'g 7 F. Supp. 892 (E. D. Ill. 1934), 35 COL. L. REv. xoS
(935), 48 HARv. L. REv. 676.
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followed.5 However, the present Court drew a sharp distinction between these
two types of cases, and distinguished specifically In re 21X East Delaware Place
Building Corporation.6 In that case three creditors of a dissolved corporation
were permitted to petition for reorganization, although the statutory period of
grace had run, and the factual situation was almost identical with that in the
instant case. Although the basis for this distinction was not dearly explained,
it might be supported on the theory that in order to support a voluntary petition by the debtor corporation, it is necessary to show not only the legal existence of an entity subject to liquidation or reorganization, 7 but also the capacity
of that entity to institute a proceeding in the federal court; 8 and that this capacity was lacking in the instant case. In reply, however, it might be said
that the capacity to be sued and as defendant to answer a creditor's petition
would likewise be lacking in an analogous involuntary proceeding. 9 And at all
events, there would seem to be no substantial or practical reason for making
federal jurisdiction in these cases depend upon whether the creditors or the
debtor corporation filed the petition.' 0

Libel and Slander-Extemporaneous Defamation by Radio as Slander
Rather than Libel-Defendant, by extemporaneously interpolating some
misstatments which were of his own authorship, colored a news account which
he broadcast over the radio and which he announced the plaintiff had prepared.
Plaintiff, a professional radio script writer, claimed damage to his reputation
as an accurate news reporter. Held, that no cause of action for defamation had
been stated, because this was at most slander,' but not slander per se, 2 and
5. Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; Old Fort
Improvement Co. v. Lea, 89 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937). The voluntary petitions were
allowed in these cases, but no statutes limiting the period of dissolution were involved, so it
is unlikely that the cases are overruled by the instant decision. See also instant case, lower
court, 86 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), i4 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 528 (1937). But cf. In re
Vassar Foundry Co., 293 Fed. 248 (E. D. Mich. 1923), aff'd, 2 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924), which seems to hold contra; but the effect of this case was narrowly construed in Old

Fort Improvement Co. v. Lea, supra, at 287, and it was disregarded in a subsequent decision
in the same circuit. Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, supra.
6. 76 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).

7. This fact of legal existence subject to the Bankruptcy Act would seem to be sufficiently
established by the cases where creditors' petitions were allowed. See supra note 4. See also
I GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) 167; FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
(937)
hi1; Tondel, Corporations Eligible for Relief Under Section 77B
(1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 144, 159.
8. Cf. In re Vassar Foundry Co., 293 Fed. 248, 249 (E. D. Mich. 1923) ; In re 211 East

REORGANIZATION

Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 96, ioo (N. D. Il1. 1936); Old Fort Improvement
Co. v. Lea, 86 F. (2d) 286, 289 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; I GERDEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) 268.

9. See In re 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 86 F. (2d) 667, 669 (C. C. A. 7th, x936).
io. Id. at 670; Developments in the Law-Reorganization under Section 77B of the
Objections in regard to public policy, evaBankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HaRv. L. REV. ii.
sion of state laws, etc., would seem to apply equally to both types of proceedings, and in any
case they are answered by pointing to the flexibility of the reorganization power and the strict
requirements of good faith and feasibility. See dissenting opinion, instant case at 245.
I. This general type of defamation, though comparatively rare, has precedent. Ridge v.
The "English Illustrated Magazine", 29 T. L. R 592 (K. B. 1913) ; cf. Archbold v. Sweet, 5

C. & P.

219 (N. P. 1832) ; see BowER, ACTIONABLE DEFAmATION (2d ed. 1923) 57, 298.

2. Qvaere, whether this would not be actionable per se. Words which prejudice one in
his trade, business, profession or office are defamatory per se. HiAaER, TORTS (1933) § 241;
NEWELI, SLANDER AND LIBE. (4th ed. 1924) § 129.
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therefore special damages should have been alleged.3 Locke v. Gibbons, N. Y.
Sup. Ct., (i937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 183.
Ever since the leading American case of Sorensen v. Wood,' in which the
court held it to be libel to read defamatory matter over the radio,5 inferring that
unwritten defamation by radio would be slander, legal commentators have speculated 6 as to how the courts would eventually classify such an extemporaneous
defamatory radio utterance.7 The instant case answers this question, but hardly
satisfactorily. As a result of the invention of radio, the area of dissemination
of the spoken word has been immeasurably extended," so that today the potential harm inherent in uttering defamatory matter over the radio is at least as
great as in the printed publication thereof." Consequently, what has been the
most cogent argument for attaching broader liability to libel than to slander 10
no longer applies to radio cases. In recognition of this fact, the legislatures of
several states have extended the criminal law of libel to include defamation by
radio, :' although some still persist in calling it slander. 12 But the courts have
thus far been unwilling to adopt the more enlightened view. Subsequent to
Sorensen v. Wood, several similar cases arose,33 but in all of them significant
discussion of the matter was carefully avoided. Then the instant court, disregarding the merits of the situation, followed the dictum in the Sorensen case. It
seems unjust to grant a remedy to one who is defamed by a statement read
from a script, but to deny redress to another who, although equally injured by
an extemporaneous radio utterance, is unable to show special damages or slander
per se. Certainly the defendant's conduct in the two cases is equally repre3. "Libel is in all cases actionable per se; but slander is not actionable without proof of
special damage, save in certain exceptional cases." SALoNi0, TORTS (7th ed. I928) § 147.
4. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932), 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 228. Although this was the
first defamation by radio case in America, it was preceded in England by Williams & Norgate,
Ltd. v. British Broadcasting Co. (unreported, Eng. 1926), referred to in Note (1926) 70
SoL J.613. See also Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., [1932] Vict. L. R. 425 (slander), criticized in Redmond, Reading from Script into Broadcasting Apparatus-Libel or
Slander (933) 7 AusT. L. J.257.
5. This holding deviated from precedent, but was justifiable. See (932) 81 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 228. This rule was adopted in RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1935)
§ 3OO,comment f.
6. See, e. g., Professor Harper's comment at meeting of American Law Institute. 32
PRoc. Am. L. INsT. (935) 347. See also Notes (3932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 133, 134, 66 U. S.
L. REv. 637; (1932) 8i U. OF PA. L. REV. 228.
7. REsTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1935) § 3030 (3), comment f, takes no
definite stand in the matter. For a criticism of this Section, see Farmum, Radio Defamation,
and the American Law Institute (1936) i6 B. U. L. REv. 1,3.
8. W. J. DAvis, RADIO LAW (2d ed. 393o) 69; Haley, The Law on Radio Prograns
(1937) 5 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. I57, 183.
9.See ZOLLMAx, LAW OF THE Am 03927) § 195; Void, The Basis for Liability for
Defamation by Radio (935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 61i, 643.
1o. ". . . the common law distinction . . . seems to be based upon the more permanent nature and the wider dissemination of libelous statements." W. J. DAviS, loc. cit. supra
note 8. See also Cardozo, C. J., in Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 39, 175 N. E. 505, 5o6
(193i). As to the necessity of "permanence' as an element of libel, which factor the instant
court emphasized, see Professor Harper's comment in 12 PROC. Am. L. INST. (3935) 347.
But cf. SEELmAN, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEv YORK (1933) § 7.
ii. Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 682, § 258; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, § 567 (1); N. D.
Laws 1929, C. 117; Ore. Laws 1931, c. 366; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 17. Similar measures have
been introduced in other legislatures, but without success. See Note (1932) 46 HAIv. L. REV.
133, 134, n. io.
12. Cal. Stat 1929, c. 682, § 258; ILL.REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, § 567 (1); N. D.

Laws

1929, C.

17.

Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934), Note (935)
6 Am L. REv. 81; King v. Winchell, 248 App. Div. 809, 29o N. Y. Supp. 558 (4th Dep't,
3936) ; Weglein v. Golder, 37 Pa. 437, 177 Atl. 47 (I935), 6 Am L. REV. i95; Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933), 7 So. CALIF. L. REV. 346 (3934) ; Singler v.
Journal Co., 238 Wis. 263, 26o N. W. 431 (935).
33.
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hensible. 14 Thus, this decision, even though it is by a lower court, is to be regretted. As the first clear-cut American holding on the subject, it will undoubtedly disappoint not only those who feel that all defamation by radio should be
treated as libel,' 5 but also the few far-sighted writers 16 who have seen in the
advent of radio an opportunity to abolish completely the historical and frequently
criticized distinction "7between libel and slander.
Public Service Corporations-Validity of Temporary Rate Order
Issued Without Findings of Fact-The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, pursuant to statute,' ordered complainant to effect a temporary rate reduction in its electric power service pending a final determination in a rate
inquiry. The order did not contain findings of fact showing how the temporary
rate base was determined. Complainant sought to enjoin enforcement of the
order. Held, that enforcement of the order should be enjoined, because it was
unconstitutional, although the statute was valid. 2 Edison Light & Power Co.
v.Driscoll, M. D. Pa., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 16o.
Previous cases, declaring unconstitutional temporary rates which did not
provide for recovery of loss sustained under them, have by implication suggested that the objection of lack of due process would be removed if the utility
could recover any loss it might suffer because of the temporary4 rate.3 Thereseem
fore, since the Pennsylvania Act contains a recoupment clause, it would
that it is constitutional. 5 However, the majority, although so holding,6 did not
14. See Farnum, supra note 7, at 4.
15. SEELaIAN, loc. cit. supra note 1o; ZOLLMAN, loc. Cit. supra note 9; Farnum, loc. cit.
supra note 7; Vold, loc. cit. stpra note 9; Notes (1926) 3o LAW NOTES 3, (1932) 8I U. oF
PA. L. REv. 228.
Some writers anticipate the emergence of a new and separate tort, "defamation by radio",
to resemble libel in the degree of liability imposed. Notes (1933) 12 ORE. L. REV. 149, 153,
(1936) go SOL. J. 8oi. The assimilation of the law of defamatory broadcasting to that of
libel by legislative action has also been suggested. W. J. DAvis, loc. cit. supra note 8; Notes
12 OrE. L. REV. 149, 151; cf.
3 Am L. REV. 64, 67, (933)
(1926) 3o LAW NOTES 3, (932)
statutes cited supra note ii. On the other hand, some believe, as did the instant and Sorensen
courts, that if the defamatory radio address is Written, it is libel; otherwise, slander. Ashby,
Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcasting (I93O) I Am L. REV. 331, 343; Notes (1932) 46 HARv.
L. REv. 133, 66 U. S. L. REv. 637. Others would call all radio defamation slander. S. DAvis,
THE LAW OF RADIO COmmUNIcATION (1927) 158, I6I; Sprague, Freedom of the Air (1937)
8 Am L. REv. 30.
I6. Maxwell, Defamation by Radio (936) 4 KAw. B. A. J. 245, 246; Notes (1926) 70
Sor- J. 613, (932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 133, 134.
17. See Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 364 (C. P. 812) ; Veeder, History and
Theory of the Law of Defamation (904) 4 COL. L. REv. 33, 54; (I932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REV.
228; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1935) § IOIO, comment b. There is no such
distinction in Roman or Scotch Law, nor in the Indian Penal Code. Bower, supra note i, at
289.
i. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, § 310 (a) : "The [public utility] commission may . . . prescribe temporary rates to be charged . . . pending the final determination of such rate proceeding."
2. Davis, C. J., concurred in the injunction, but dissented on the constitutionality of the
statute. Johnson, D. J., concurred in holding the order invalid, but felt that enforcement
should be stayed for fifteen days to allow the commission to correct the defect.
3. Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1923) ; Indiana Gen. Serv. Co. v.
McCardle, I F. Supp. 113 (S. D. Ind. 1932).
4. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, § 310 (e).
5. A similar New York statute [N. Y. Coiqs. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1931-1935) c. 49,
§ 114] was held constitutional in Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 364, 3 N. E.
(2d) 512 (936), 36 COL. L. Rav. 1177, 31 ILL. L. REV. 404. The majority in the instant case
followed this decision.
6. Neither the opinion of the court nor the briefs of counsel disclose any discussion of the
Johnson Act, 48 STAT. 775, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (I) (Supp. 1936) which provides that "no
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expressly meet the argument of the minority of the court. The latter contended
that since the recoupment clause did not provide for the payment of interest, the
Act was still invalid under the due process clause.7 Admittedly there is no express provision for interest, yet it would seem that the language of the Act
could reasonably be interpreted to include it. Inasmuch as the statute provides
that the utility may recover in the future the difference between the gross income received under the temporary order and that which would have been
obtained had the final rate been in effect,8 it seems fair to say that this future
payment, in order to equal the past loss, must include interest. Then, conceding that e)cept for the interest question the Act would be constitutional, it would
seem that the legislative intent should be effectuated by a favorable interpretation of the recoupment provision. It is submitted, therefore, that the majority,
although apparently not considering the interest problem, was, nevertheless,
correct in its decision on the constitutional issue. On the other hand, the order
as distinguished from the statute, was invalid, because, not being supported
by findings of fact,9 it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 Thus, the case indicates that while an order issued without findings
of fact is void, an order supported by some findings will be upheld. But the
question of what those findings of fact must be is left unanswered. However,
it is evident that if the courts require the commission to make such findings
as would support a final order, they will render nugatory the provision for a
temporary rate. Since the purpose of the statute is to avoid the inequities of
the long delay incident to fixing a final rate,1" the courts should require the comand set forth as findings, comparatively few and easily
mission to consider,
12
determined facts.

Taxation-Income Tax-Payments to Employee by Corporation as
Compensation or Gift-In contemplation of a sale by corporation A of its
stock to another company, corporation B was formed to take over part of A's
assets. Shareholders of B, who were formerly shareholders of A, voted a "gift
or honorarium" to the plaintiff and other former employees of A, although not
district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to enjoin . . . any order . . . of a commission . . . where jurisdiction is based solely upon . . . the repugnance of such order to
the Constitution of the United States . . . where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may
be had at law or in equity in the courts of such State." Perhaps it was thought that § 3io (e)
of the state Act, although providing a plain and efficient remedy, did not provide a speedy one.
7. Instant case at 161.
8. Pa. Laws I937, no. 286, § 310 (e).
9.Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm. v. Edison Light & Power Co., Interim Rep. Imposing
Temporary Rates, Complaint Docket, no. IIIo8, July 27, I937.
io. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm. of Ohio, 3O U. S. 292 (1937) (order for
refund of "excess" earnings based on undisclosed findings) ; Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 128 Pa. Super. 195, 193 AtI. 427 (1937) (final rate proceedings
in reduction of rates of utility supplying gas).
ii. The elements as laid down in Smyth v. Ames, i69 U. S.466 (1898), that are to be
considered in complying with the "fair return on a fair value' formula require much time for
their determination. During this time the utility benefits by the continuance of the disputed
excessive rate. See Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utiliier During the Depression (I933)
46 HARv.L. Ray. 745, 754, 775; Notes (193o) YALE L. J. 8I, 86-87, (937) 46 YALE L. J. 505.
12. The commission in subsequent orders has not only set forth findings of fact supporting the temporary rate base, but has considered elements in addition to accrued cost and depreciation. But inasmuch as these orders have not been subjected to judicial review, it is uncertain if even these findings of fact will be sufficient to prevent the courts from terming the
action arbitrary. See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co., Interim
Rep. and Order of the Comm., Complaint Docket, no. 11,441, October i9,x937; Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., Rep. and Order of the Comm., Temporary Rate
Docket no. i, October i9,1937.
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under any obligation to do so, in recognition of past services to A. Held
(Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone, and Black, JJ., dissenting), that the payments were
gifts and hence not taxable as income.' Bogardus v. Commissioner, U. S. Sup.
Ct., (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 201.
Before this decision, the courts of appeals of the various circuits were in
conflict as to whether the payments in similar situations amounted to compensation or gift.2 Because of this confusion, it was desirable that the Supreme
Court establish a rule which would foster certainty and predictability in these
cases, -and thus alleviate the administrative burden on the Treasury Department. However, the Court decided this case strictly on its facts. Also, as the
minority points out,8 it is inferable from the majority opinion that where elements of a gift are shown, the payment cannot at the same time be compensation for services.4 This construction would create possible doubt, where none
existed before, as to the taxability of "bonus" payments. 5 The administrative
problem of the Treasury is thus not only still unsolved, but is, in fact, further
complicated. When, in the future, taxes are assessed on any payment of this
type,6 and perhaps also on "bonus" payments, in all probability litigation will
follow, and the collection and settlement of taxes will be unnecessarily deferred. In this light the decision is unfortunate. It is suggested that a satisfactory rule would be to hold that where a payment is made to one who has
rendered some service directly or indirectly to the corporation making the payment, it shall be deemed to be compensation for services; 7 and only upon the
clearest showing that the payment comprises all the elements of a gift and none
of the essential qualities of compensation will an exception be made to the general rule. This result would seem to be warranted in view of the fact that
shareholders of a corporation do not ordinarily vote to give away surplus in
"an unrestrained act of affection and regard." 8 Their usual purpose is rather
to make an additional return for services rendered, through which the shareholders themselves have benefited. In addition, the suggested rule would certainly be welcomed from the standpoint of tax administration. 9
i. Rev'g 34 B. T. A. 1310 (1936), and 88 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Statute involved is 45 STAT. 791 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. 22 (a), (b) (3) (Supp. 1936).
2. Jones v. Commissioner, 31 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) (gift) ; Blair v. Rosseter,
33 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) (gift) ; Fisher v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 192 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1932) (compensation). Cases involving transactions similar to that in the instant
case, but where payment was held to constitute compensation: Walker v. Commissioner, 88
F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937) ; Hull v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ;
Simpkinson v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). Most cases holding the
payment compensation are based on Noel v. Parrott, 15 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926),
cert. denied, 273 U. S. 754 (1927).

3. Instant case at 204.

4. Instant case at 203.

5. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1928) ; Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.
(2d) 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Holbrook v. Moore, 293 Fed. 264 (D. C. Mo. i921) ; Schumacher v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1932) ; Levy v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A.
889 (1932).

6. On right of corporation to deduct these payments on its income tax return, see (i93i)

15 MINx. L. REV. 243.

7. A suggestion by inference that such a presumption does or should exist may be found
in Landon v. Commissioner, I6 B. T. A. 907 (1929). Also, in the decision of the instant case
in the lower court, 88 F. (2d) 646, 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), it is intimated that a payment to
an old employee is nearly always compensation and therefore taxable income.
8. See lower court opinion of instant case, 88 F. (2d) 646, 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
9. The dissenting justices suggested a possible test, but it is too vague to be of any assistance, would merely lead to various interpretations by different courts, and hence would not
give any certainty of prediction to the Treasury. The minority suggested that it be determined whether the payment was ". . . made with the intention that services rendered in the
past shall be requited more completely, though full acquittance has been given," or, on the
other hand ". . . to show good will, esteem, or kindliness towards persons who happen to
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Taxation-Income Tax-Taxability of Rights to Subscribe to Shares in
Another Corporation-A corporation issued to its shareholders rights to
subscribe to the shares which it owned in, another corporation. At the time of
the resolution authorizing the rights, the subscription price represented the fair
market value of the shares,' but on the date of distribution the market value
was double the subscription price.2 Held, that neither the receipt nor the exercise of the rights constituted a taxable dividend, because there was no intention to distribute earnings, but merely an intention to effect a sale. Palmer v.
Commissioner, 58 Sup. Ct. 67 (1937).
3

It was assumed by some writers that, after the Koshland case, the re-

ceipt of the right to subscribe to stock in another corporation constituted a
realization of income.4 The Court here denies that the receipt of such a right
constitutes income, and holds that no income is realized even upon the exercise
of the right, if at the time of the authorization the subscription price was the
same as the fair market value of the stock. The latter ruling seems correct,
in effect no dividend,
since at the time the resolution was adopted there was
5
nor was one intended. The corporation had committed itself to a sale of shares
at their fair market value; therefore, any subsequent change in value which is
not in the corporation's control should not operate to convert this sale into a
dividend. However, the conclusion that the mere receipt of such7 rights "is not
a dividend" 6 so as to constitute taxable income is apparently based on the
"outgo" test of Eisner v. Macomber," to the effect that there must be a separation of something from the corporate assets. But in the reorganization cases 9
have served, but who are payed without thought to make requital for the service." Instant
case at 204. As was suggested in the dissenting opinion, if this test were adopted, the finding
of fact by the Board of Tax Appeals should be conclusive unless clearly contrary to the evidence.
i. The Circuit Court had refused to adopt these facts as found by the Board, holding that
the evidence showed that the fair market value was in excess of the subscription price at the
date of the resolution. Commissioner v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559, 561 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937).
2. Certiorari was granted, 57 Sup. Ct. 922 (1937), because of the varying opinions in the
Circuit Courts. Compare Commissioner v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937), 47
Y.LE L. J.I39; Ramapo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), 31 ILL.
L. REv.537, 37 COL. L. Rxv. 664 (937) (both of these cases held that since the subscription
price was below the market, the exercise of the rights constituted a taxable dividend), with
Helvering v. Bartlett, 71 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), 41 W. VA. L. Q. 93; Commissioner v. Cummings, 77 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
3. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (936).
4. See MAGiLL, TAXABLE INcOME (1936) 50; Legis. (936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 83,
io8. Cf. Metcalf's Estate v. Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (taxpayer received rights to subscribe to shares of another corporation and subsequently sold them; their
receipt was apparently considered income). The Treasury Department considered this case
as authority for taxing these rights as dividends as of date of record, see VIII-i Cuu. Buu.
But see MONTGomERY, FEDERAl. TAX HANDBOOK
219 (1929); X-2 Cum. BuLL. 173 (193i).
(1936-1937) 373.

Although inMiles v.Safe Deposit Co., 259 U. S.247 (1922) it was held, by analogy to
Eisner v. Macomber, that the receipt of rights to subscribe to the same class of shares in the
same corporation did not constitute a realization of income taxable as a dividend, some writers
(the distribution of shares
assumed, by analogy to Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S.347 (g1)
in another corporation is a taxable dividend), that the receipt of rights to shares in another
corporation at less than their market value would constitute a realization of income taxable
as a dividend.
5. See Note (193o) 39 YALE L. J.n163. Contra: Cohn v. Cities Service Co. (S. D. N.
Y. 1930) (unreported), rev'd on jurisdictionalgrounds, 45 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o).
6.45 STAT.822 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (1934).
7.Instant case at 70.
8.252 U. S.i89, at 207 (1920).
9.United States v.Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (i92i) ; Rockefeller v.United States, 257 U.
S.176 (i92) ; Cullinan v.Walker,262 U. S.134 (1923) ; Marr v.United States, 268 U. S.
536 (1925). See Legis. (1936) 85 U. oF PA. L.REv. 83, at 101.
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and in the Koshland case, the Court, in determining what constituted the realization of income, did not require a severance from the corporate assets, but
merely the receipt of a different property interest. By this test it is recognized
that the date of receipt of this new interest is the most convenient and practical time for taxation.10 Assuming that at the time of authorization a dividend
had been effectuated, certainly the receipt of the rights would meet the latter
test of realization. But the Court in the instant case indicated that in any event
there would be no realization until the sale or exercise of the rights. It is regrettable that the Court by its language has not only confused the concept of
what constitutes a realization of income, but has shown a willingness to revert
to the less practical of the two rules of realization.

Taxation-State Income Tax-Interest from "Non-Taxable" State and
County Bonds as Taxable Income-Plaintiffs were owners of certain bonds
its political subdivisions, which, by statute, were
of the State of Iowa and
"exempt from taxation". 1 Interest upon these bonds was included in a tax
assessment on the net income of the owners under a subsequently enacted state
personal income tax law. 2 Plaintiffs claimed that this was an unconstitutional
impairment of the prior statutory contract of exemption. Held (Sutherland,
MciReynolds and Butler, JJ., dissenting), that the assessment was proper, because the statutory exemptions did not apply to a tax on income. Hale v. Iowa
State Board of Assessment and Review, 58 Sup. Ct. lO2 (1937).'

Starting with the general proposition that tax exemptions are strictly construed, 4 the Court proceeded to the syllogism that the 5statutory exemptions in
the instant case apply only to "direct property taxes", that an income tax is
not a "direct property tax",6 ergo a tax on income is not subject to the exemptions. The difficulty lies in establishing the minor premise. The exact nature
of the income tax has never been satisfactorily analyzed. State courts are divided on the question,7 and the confusion is especially pronounced in the decisions of the Supreme Court itself." In the celebrated case of Pollock v. Farmers
io.

MAGILL,

op. cit. supra note 4, at 37; (1937) 47

YALE L. J. 139, 142.

i.Although there were four different bond issues involved, the following is illustrative
of the tax-exempting clause in all: "The following classes of property are not to be taxed:
IowA CODE (1935) § 6944 (5).
. . . municipal, school, and drainage bonds. . ."
2. IOWA CODE (1935) § 6943 (f) (4), et seq.
3. Aff'g 271 N. W. 168 (Iowa, 1937). Accord: Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Comm.,
217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (1935), Note (1937) 22 IOwA L. REv. 411.
4.See Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 491 (932); 4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed.
1924) § 1760.
5.Although never applied to an income tax case, since there never was such a tax in
Iowa before, this is the settled rule in Iowa. Sioux City v. Independent School Dist., 55 Iowa
150, 7 N. W. 488 (i88o) ; State v. Des Moines, 221 Iowa 642, 266 N. W. 41 (936); cf.
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S.620 (1929). See also 4 COOLEY, TAXATI ON (4th
ed. 1924) § 176o; Note (1937) 22 IOWA L. REv. 411, at 412.
Contra: Kelley v.
6. Miles v. Treasury Dep't, 209 Ind. 172, 193 N. E. 855 (935).
Kalodner, 320 Pa. i8o, 181 Atl. 598 (1935), where it was said, at 186, 18I Atl. at 6o:
a.
. . an income tax is a property tax. . . . a tax upon the income from bonds and stocks
17
is a tax upon the securities themselves." Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax (1933)
See Traynor and Keesling,
MINN. L. REV. 127; 4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1743.
The Scope and Nature of the CaliforniaIncome Tax (1936) 24 CA.I. L. REV. 493, 509, n. 75.
7. Ibid.
8. Brown, supra note 6, at 140; 4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1743. Compare
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S.429 (895), aff'd on rehearing, i58 U. S.
6ox (i895) with People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 3oo U. S.3o8 (937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REV.
645.
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Loan & Trust Co.,9 the Court held that an income tax was a direct tax on
property. In later decisions, however, that case has been frequently distinguished and the holdings reconciled.' 0 An unequivocal ruling one way or the
other was now in order, especially in view of the dissenting opinion," which was
based on the theory that the interest on an obligation is as much a part of it2
as the principal, and that a tax on the interest is a tax on the bonds themselves.1
And yet, the Court in the instant case remained disappointingly evasive and noncommittal, carefully pointing out that it was not ruling one way or the other,
but was merely not disapproving the ruling of the Supreme Court of Iowa.'8
The Court might have avoided the difficulty more subtly by resting its holding
on the reasoning of the Gilchrist case,' 4 that because the income tax was enacted
subsequent to the statute of exemption, it could not have been within the intent
of the legislature to exempt the interest on the bonds as non-taxable income.
The general uncertainty of the Court ought to serve as a warning that the entire problem might best be solved by a clearer legislative statement in regard
to tax exemptions, as many state legislatures have already realized.' 5 Or, as an
alternative, the Supreme Court might re-examine the income tax, and by deliberately analyzing its nature, announce a doctrine, clearcut and unequivocal, which
may serve as a guide in the future.
Trusts-Credit Balances in Other Banks Included with Bank's Cash as
Single Fund for Tracing Purposes-The trust company determined to take
advantage of an emergency resolution of the Legislature ' permitting insolvent
banks to accept new deposits, provided they were segregated and deposited in
liquid assets only. Thereafter, three deposits were made. Previously, another
claimant had deposited for collection a check on a Philadelphia bank which was
9. 157 U. S. 429 (I895), aff'd on rehearing, 158 U. S. 6oi (I895).
io. See instant case at io6; People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 3oo U. S. 308, 315 (1937);
Brushhaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 24o U. S. I, 18 (19,5) ; Lowndes, The Supreme Court on
Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. I, i49, at 151. But Brown, supra note 6,
at 41, refuses to be reconciled: "So long as the Pollock case stands, the theory of the income
tax as one of the classes of excise taxes, cannot be regarded as adequate." In support of the
distinctions made, see Note (937) 2 IOWA L. REv. 411, at 416.
ii. Instant case at 1O7.
12. In the Brushhaber case, 240 U. S. x, 16 (9,5), the Court intimated that the reason
behind its holding in the Pollock case was that the source of the income taxed was tangible
property, thereby inferring that it would have ruled otherwise had the income been derived,
for instance, from services. That the Court has forgotten its reasoning in that case is evident
from the Cohn case, for there, too, the income had its origin in tangible property, but still the
Court held that the tax was not a property tax; likewise in the instant case. The reasoning of
the dissenting justices is a throw-back to the reasoning of the Pollock case, which has all but
been abandoned by the Supreme Court itself.
13. "Our duty does not call upon us to determine which view we would accept as supported by the better reason if the choice were an original one for us, unaffected by the view
accepted in the court below. Enough for present purposes that with authority so nearly
balanced the Iowa construction of the contract is at leastnot plainly wrong." (Italics supplied.)
Further on the Court continues: ". . . decisions of our own court forbid us to stigmatize as
unreasonable the classification of a tax upon net income as something different from a property tax, if not substantially an excise." Instant case at 105.
x4. People ex rel. Clyde v. Gilchrist, 262 U. S. 94 (1923).
I5. See generally, hTeuhoff, Gross Income and Deductions under State Income Tax Laws
(1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 196, 197. Many states have avoided the problem involved in the instant case by expressly providing for the inclusion [e. g., Mont. Laws 1933, c. i8r, § 7; Okla.
Laws 1935, c. 66, art. 6, § 8 (b) (4)] or exclusion [e. g., Mo. Acts 1917, § 4, p. 526; Minn.
Laws 1933, . 405, § 12 (f)] of such interest upon tax-free obligations of the taxing state as
taxable income, either in the income tax law itself [GA. CoDE (1933) § 92-3107 (b)] or by
general exemption provisions [TENN. CODE (Will., Shan. & Harsh, 1932) §§ Io86-io8g].
z. Pa. Laws 1933, p. 1546. The resolution was included in the Sordoni Act, Pa. Laws
1933, P. 9.
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not honored until after the resolution had been adopted. When the Secretary
of Banking ultimately took over the trust company, there were sufficient assets
to satisfy the claims, although the trust company had never segregated the funds
as required. Held, that the trust company, in failing to segregate, became a
trustee ex maleficio, and that the claimants were entitled to priority in the distribution of its cash assets and credit balances. In re Title Trust & Guarantee
Co. Account, Pa. Sup. Ct., November 12, 1937.
In view of the failure of the trust company to segregate the claimants'
funds as required by the emergency resolution, the court felt that the claimants
were entitled to full reimbursement, irrespective of their ability to trace the
proceeds of their money. It would seem that this interpretation is erroneous,
since it is well established in Pennsylvania that priority in distribution is dependent not only upon the ability of a claimant to prove his preferred status,
but also upon his ability to trace his property. 2 As the emergency resolution
failed to provide for non-compliance with its terms, application of the accepted
view that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed
leads to the conclusion that the exception to the law of tracing was unwarranted.3
Nevertheless, even if tracing had been required, the court decided that the
Pennsylvania rule, granting priority where the claimant can trace his money
into some specific fund, property or account,4 had been satisfied. In this respect, it appears that the check deposited for collection was honored by the
Philadelphia bank, which credited the account of the trust company, and that
subsequent unexplained withdrawals by the latter reduced that account to less
than the amount of the check. 5 However, there was always enough money in
the combined cash accounts and credit balances of the trust company to satisfy
all similar claims." In determining that there had been sufficient tracing, the
court followed Erie Trust Company's Case (No. 1),7 discussed in a recent issue
of the REvIEw," holding that cash, cash items and credit balances in other banks
are to be considered as one fund, so that tracing the trust res into one of those
accounts entitles a claimant to priority in the distribution of all of them. Although the result is considered highly desirable 9 by at least one Pennsylvania
writer,10 and has been reached in other jurisdictions," the basis of the result2
is the difficulty of following funds through numerous banking transactions,1
and it should be recognized as an exception to the rule of specific tracing.' s
2. Pittsburgh's Appeal, 316 Pa. 125, 173 Atl. 288 (1934) ; Girard Ave. Title & Trust Co.
Case, 317 Pa. 313, 176 AtI. 443 (1935) ; Lansdowne Bank & Trust Co.'s Case, 323 Pa. 38o,
186 Atl. 120 (1936). See also RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 202, comment o.
3. The resolution is not analogous to § 13 of the Bank Collection Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 7, § 224, as the latter contains express provisions for priority without tracing, under certain circumstances, none of which is involved in the instant case.
4. Mehler's Appeal, 310 Pa. 25, 164 AtI. 61g (1932), 8I U. OF PA. L. REv. 888 (1933);

Royersford Trust Co. Case, 317 Pa. 49o, 178 Atl. 288 (1935) ; Bangor Trust Co. Account,
317 Pa. 495, 178 AtI. 290 (935).

5. The other three claimants showed that their money had been put in the general funds
of the trust company. There was no attempt to trace into the credit balances in other banks.
6. The court stated that the balance was presumed to have been adequate between the time
of the deposits and the date
otherwise. This appears to
7. 326 Pa. 198, I91 Atl.
8. (937) 86 U. oF PA.

of the receivership, the burden being upon the receiver to prove
be the first Pennsylvania decision on this point
613 (937).

L. REv. 112.

9. In a companion case, decided the same day, both the instant case and the Erie Trust

Co.'s Case (No. i) were cited with approval. In re Johnson Trusts, Pa. Sup. Ct., Nov. 12,
1937.
io. Shippen Lewis, Tracing Mingled Trust Funds (1933) 15 PA.
B. A. Q. 23, 3r.
Il. Schumacher v. Harriett, 52 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1931), 8o U. OF PA. L. REv.
587 (1932) ; Reichert v. United Savings Bank, 255 Mich. 685, 239 N. W.

v. First Nat Bank, 131 Ore. 350, 281 Pac. 172 (1929).
12. See Erie Trust Co.'s Case (No. i), 326 Pa. 198, 2o7, I9
13. See supra note 4.

393 (193)

; Lane

Atl. 613, 617 (I937).
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Trusts-Denial of Right of Settlor of Tentative Trust to Set Off Deposit against Claim of Insolvent Bank-Plaintiff opened a savings account
in his own name "in trust" for his minor son. Upon the failure of the bank,
plaintiff filed a bill in equity to compel the defendant receiver to set off the balance of the deposit against the claim of the bank on certain notes endorsed by
the plaintiff.1 Held, that the plaintiff had no right of set-off, because at the
time of the failure of the bank,2 the deposit constituted a tentative trust and
therefore was still subject to the interest of the beneficiary. Kardon v. Willing,
2o F. Supp. 471 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
In holding that the beneficiary of a tentative trust has an interest in the
deposit before the settlor's death, the instant court reached a logical result under
strict trust principles, but thereby undermined the validity and usefulness of the
tentative trust doctrine. The doctrine was devised in order to facilitate the
testamentary disposition of small sums without requiring the formalities of the
Statute of Wills 3 and the attendant probate expenses. 4 At the same time, it
permitted the depositor to retain complete control over the funds during his
lifetime, in spite of the conflict with the strict trust rule against such control by
the settlor.5 The resulting situation was of necessity si generis. Therefore,
the application of the orthodox law of trusts or of wills to problems arising
under the tentative trust doctrine will naturally lead to confusion. These new
situations must be resolved with the purpose of the doctrine fully in mind.6
Thus, it has been held that the beneficiary could not recover any funds withdrawn by the depositor, because it was not intended that the beneficiary have
any interest in the deposit until the depositor's death. 7 Furthermore, creditors
of a depositor who has left no other assets have been permitted to reach the
fund prior to the beneficiary.8 However, the instant court, apparently feeling
that the deposit created a trust in the orthodox sense but with extraordinary
i. Where the endorser will have no recourse against the maker of the note, as is the
situation in the instant case, it is well settled that the endorser, as an ordinary depositor, may
set off his deposit against the claim of the insolvent bank on the note. Shannon v. Sutherland, 74 F. (2d) 530 (C. C. A 4th, 1935) ; 5 MicHI, BANKS AND BANKING (932) § 161;
Note (1935) I5 B. U. L. REv. 96.
2. The question of the right of set-off is to be determined as of the time of the insolvency
of the bank. Dakin v. Bayly, 29o U. S. 143 (933).
3. See, e. 9., 7 WILL. IV & I VIcr. c. 26 (1837), as amended by 15 & I6 VicT. c. 24

(852).

4. The doctrine originated in New York. Matter of Totten, I79 N. Y. 12, 71 N. E. 748
(1904). It has been adopted in Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 Atl. 317 (1935) ; Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 272 N. W. I66 (Minn. 1937) ; Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa.
Super. 93, 188 At. 209 (936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 646 (1937); RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS
(1935) § 8. Contra: Cazallis v. Ingraham, i19 Me. 24o, 11o Atl. 359 (1920); HogarthSwam v. Steele, 2 N. E. (2d) 446 (Mass. 1936) ; Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co., 119 N. J.
Eq. 408, 182 Atl. 912 (Ch. 1936). For a discussion of the doctrine and the status of deposits
"in trust" in other states, see Scott, Developments in the Law, Trusts (1935) 48 HAv. L.
REv. 1168; Note (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 737.
5. See RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 57 (3), comment h.
6. See Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 618, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623, 626 (Surr. Ct. 1933),
8I U. OF PA. L. REv. iOII, 42 YALE L. J. 1136; Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will
(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 626; Notes (934) 39 DiciK. L. REv. 37, (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
1133.

7. Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N. Y. Supp. 869 (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; Matter
of Kelly, 51iMisc. 277, 271 N. Y. Supp. 457 (Surr. Ct. 1934) (not payment of a debt because
beneficiary received no interest) ; Kelly v. General Finance Co., 16 Pa. D. & C. 435 (193)
(attachment by beneficiary's creditors not allowed because he had no interest) ; cf. Matter of
Rasmussen, 147 Misc. 564, 264 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Young v. Dollar Say.
Bank, 25 Pa. D. & C. 8o (1935).
8. Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't, 19o8) ;
Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (for funeral expenses) ;
Matter of Weinberg, 296 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; see also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(935) § 58, comment c.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

powers of revocation, 9 held that the beneficiary had an interest in the fund before revocation by the depositor, and that therefore the latter had no right to set
off the deposit against a claim of the bank. In view of the actual, unrestricted
control over the fund retained by the depositor, who clearly intends that the
beneficiary shall have no interest until his death, the instant decision0 seems to
be out of line with the real purpose of the tentative trust doctrine.'
Trusts-Liability of Bank for Participation in Breach of Trust under
Uniform Fiduciaries Act-Trustee, a corporation, by a check payable to itself
individually, transferred funds from the trust account to its overdrawn personal
account in the same bank, thereby wiping out the overdraft. Subsequently, the
bank accepted a check drawn on those funds in payment of a personal loan previously made to the corporation. Suit was brought against the bank as a participant in the breach of trust, to recover the sums thus misappropriated. The
trial court found that the defendant had no actual notice of the fiduciary's misconduct. Held (two justices dissenting in part), that the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act ' only applied to relieve the bank from liability for the amount of the loan,
and the plaintiff could recover the amount of the overdraft. Colby v. Riggs
National Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183 (App. D. C. 1937).
At common law, the defendant bank's liability for both sums would probably be unquestioned. 2 For although a majority of jurisdictions denied liability
for participation in a breach of trust where the depository merely permitted a
deposit of trust funds in the trustee's personal account without actual knowledge of the fiduciary's misconduct, 3 it was generally agreed that the bank was
chargeable with notice of the breach 4 and was liable as a participant therein,
if it accepted those funds in payment of the trustee's personal indebtedness.5
Conflicting decisions on the question of "constructive notice" in other situa-7
tions, 6 however, and the vehement criticism evoked by the doctrine generally,
9. The court seems to have been misled by the language of the tentative trust rule stated
in the RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 58. A closer examination of that rule will not support
. .
the court's interpretation, inasmuch as the terms "intended trust" and "enforceable
upon the death of the depositor" are used. See also id. at comment c.
io. Cf. Wilbur v. Mortgage Loan Co., 153 S. C. 14, 149 S. E. 262 (1929).
1. 9 U. L. A. (1932) 147; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. II, c. 3.
2. On the general subject of a bank's liability for participation in a breach of trust, see
Scott, Participationin a Breach of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 454; Thulin, Misappropriation of Funds by Fiduciaries: The Bank's Liability (igi8) 6 CALIF. L. REV. 171; Notes
(1930)

25 ILL. L. REv. 298, (1933)

17 MINN. L. REV. 405.

See also New Amsterdam

Casualty Co. v. Robertson, 129 Ore. 663, 278 Pac. 963, 64 A. L. R. 1396 (1929).
3. Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 4o9, 97 N. E. g16 (1912) ; Safe Deposit & Trust
Contra: Bank of Hickory v.
Co. v. Diamond Nat. Bank, 194 Pa. 334, 44 Atl. 1064 (9oo).
McPherson, 1o2 Miss. 852, 59 So. 934 (1912) ; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. People's
Bank, 127 Tenn. 720, 157 S. W. 414 (1913).

In support of the minority, see also Merrill,

Bankers' Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His PersonalAccount (1927) 4o HARV. L.
REv. 1077. The majority likewise held that the bank was not liable for permitting subsequent

withdrawals from that deposit by means of personal checks payable to third persons, in the
absence of actual knowledge of the fiduciary's misconduct. Accord: Allen v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 224 Mass. 239, 112 N. E. 650 (igi6).
4. See Scott, supranote 2, at 475.
5. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Union Bank, 228 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915);
Rodgers v. Bankers Nat. Bank, 179 Minn. 197, 229 N. W. 90 (1930) ; Bischoff v. Yorkville
Bank, 218 N. Y. io6, 112 N. E. 759 (igi6).
6. Compare Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. io6, 112 N. E. 759 (igi6) with Allen
v. Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. g16 (1912).
7. A case calling forth much criticism because of its application of the doctrine of constructive notice was Cahan v. Empire Trust Co., 9 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), rev'd,
274 U. S. 473 (1927). The circuit court's decision was approved by Merrill, loc. cit. supra
note 3, and criticized in Notes (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 64, 35 YALE L. J. 854. See also
the authorities cited supra note 2, for further criticism of the doctrine.
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led to the adoption of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. This Act sets up definite
rules, making liability for participation in a breach of trust absolute in certain
instances," and denying liability in others, in the absence of bad faith or actual
notice of the breach.9 Thus, by § 9,10 unless one of these latter elements is present, a bank will not be liable for honoring checks drawn by a trustee on a personal account containing fiduciary funds. Therefore, in view of the trial court's
finding, this court properly denied the bank's liability for the amount of the loan
payment.", However, the Act also provides that where a fiduciary as such
draws a check payable to himself individually and transfers it to a third party
in payment of a personal debt, the transferee is not liable unless there is actual
notice or bad faith.-2 The deposit of such a check, resulting in the payment of an
overdraft, seems to fall directly within this provision. Yet only the dissenting
justices reached this conclusion.' 3 The majority, in holding the defendant liable, reverted to common law principles, imposing upon the bank a duty of inquiry, the very result which the Fiduciaries Act was designed to prevent. 14 The
imposition of such a burden on the bank, which in effect makes it the supervisor
of the fiduciary's conduct, not only seriously interferes with an important phase
of the banking business, but also hinders honest fiduciaries in the proper performance of their duties.' 5 Only by a liberal interpretation of the Act can these
evils, accompanying the doctrine of constructive notice, be removed, and the
purpose of the statute be effectuated.
8. See §§ 4, 5, 7, 8 of the UNiFOnaI FIDUCIARUEs AcT, 9 U. L. A. (1932) 150-153.
9. See Commissioners' Notes, 9 U. L. A. (1932) 147. For general discussions of the Act,
see Notes (1924) 24 CoL. L. REV. 661, (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 863, (193o) 16 VA. L.
REv. 4O.
IO. 9 U. L. A. (1932) I53; D. C. CODE (1929) tit ii, §39.
I. Accord: New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Newark Banking Co., 117 N. J.
Eq. 264, 175 Atl. 6o9 (Ch. 1934), aff'd, 119 N. J. Eq. 540, 182 At. 824 (1936). That this
Section of the Act was intended to include the situation where a check is drawn on the personal account payable to the bank itself is evidenced by the Commissioners' Notes, 9 U. L. A.
(1932) 154, where it is pointed out that this was one of the common law exceptions to the
rule of non-liability which the Act was designed to abolish.
12. § 6, 9 U. L. A. (1932) 15I; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. Ii, § 36. This Section should be
compared with Sections 4 and 5, which provide that where the check is payable to the fiduciary
as such, the creditor will be liable if the fiduciary in fact is committing a breach of duty.
This distinction was pointed out prior to the Act in Johnson & Kettel Co. v. Longley Luncheon Co., 207 Mass. 52, 56, 92 N. E. 1035, 1037 (191o).
13. Instant case at 199.

14. In the only other case involving payment of an overdraft in this manner, decided under the Act, the court likewise refused to apply § 6, and held the bank liable. Pennsylvania
Co. v. Ninth Bank & Trust Co., 3o6 Pa. 148, 158 Atl. 251 (1932), criticized in Note (933)
81 U.

OF

PA. L. REv. 863, at 868.

15. See Scott, supra note

2,

at 480; Note (1924)

24

COL. L. REv. 661, 666.

